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MCCLELLAN'S LAST SERVICE TO THE REPUBLIC.

PART II.

THE battle of Antietam had been fought and won, on the 17th of September, 1862. General Lee had retreated across the Potomac on the night of the 18th. General McClellan, for reasons which we have detailed in our former paper, had determined that in the condition of his army after the battle an immediate advance into the enemy's country was impracticable ; and, moreover, he had reached the utmost limit from which, according to the only order that he then held, he could be justified in offensive movements. He had fought the battle of Antietam for the defense of Washington ; in command of "the troops for the defense of the capital," as the order of September 2d was framed ; and even by this construction of his authority he had taken upon himself a vast responsibility. The President, on the 1st of October, had visited the scene of the battle, learned the exhausted and destitute condition of the army, told General McClellan that he should not be ordered to move until he was ready, and voluntarily promised that he should be continued in command.

There now arose a very extraordinary condition of things. A general was in the field, at the head of an army of nearly one hundred thousand men, awaiting orders. But that army needed indispensable supplies, before it could be put in motion in pursuit of the enemy, and many of its departments required reorganization. It had, too, to perform the duty of guarding the passes of a long reach of the Potomac against a new invasion of Maryland and a sudden descent upon Washington. The higher officials at the seat of Government, who had the control of military affairs, began at an early period after the battle of Antietam to call in question the truth of

ERRATUM.—On page 309 of the "Review," for "*northern Maryland*" read "*southern Maryland*."

General McClellan's representations, that he was not receiving the supplies which he needed to enable him to execute an order to advance into the enemy's country, where he could not anticipate that his march would not be opposed. Under all ordinary circumstances, a government would unhesitatingly accept the representations of a general in the field, situated as McClellan then was, respecting the condition of his army and the possibility of an advance. Of all the military men who were in high commands during any part of our late war, McClellan was peculiarly fitted to know at all times the condition of his troops. His accomplishments as an organizer were very remarkable ; his habits of attention to the wants of his troops were unceasing ; and he never relaxed his vigilant oversight of details of a minute character. Nor were his ability and judgment as a strategist inferior to his powers as an organizer. All this was well known to the authorities in Washington. Without the existence, therefore, of some very extraordinary reason, furnishing a motive, good or bad, for not trusting General McClellan as Mr. Lincoln had voluntarily promised on the field of Antietam to trust him, it is very difficult to account for the fact that an issue was gotten up in the counsels at Washington respecting the truth of General McClellan's representations of the condition of his army.

From the 11th to the 28th of October, General McClellan constantly complained in his dispatches that his requisitions for supplies had not been met, so as to render it practicable for him to advance into the enemy's country upon an aggressive campaign. It is well known that there has been an assertion, transmitted from that day to this, that everything which he had asked for had been forwarded ; and it has been charged that it was in consequence of a constitutional indecision and want of vigor that he did not cross the Potomac in pursuit of Lee at least as early as the 10th of October. Perhaps one half of the nation to-day believe this to be true, because it was officially asserted. It is certainly untrue. The question is a question of fact, to be judged upon evidence ; and to be judged upon principles of belief such as we apply to any disputed matter of history. In that manner we shall examine this assertion.

We have presented to our readers, from President Lincoln's own lips, indubitable proof that the army was in no condition to move on the 1st of October. We shall now descend into details, and shall show that General McClellan was right in saying, as he did in his report, that, down to the 28th of October, his army still lacked the very supplies which were essential to any general move-

ment of its corps. The imperative wants of the army, after the battle of Antietam, were very numerous. Persons who are not professionally acquainted with such matters can not easily conceive of the kinds and quantities of things with which an army in active operations must be constantly supplied. We conceive of the soldier as a man whose wants have been systematically reduced to the minimum that is consistent with his efficiency. He stands before our imaginations well and appropriately clad, from the crown of his head to the sole of his foot, and with his musket, his knapsack, his ammunition-belt, and his canteen. All superfluities are discarded, and he bears on his person nothing that is not absolutely needful to his vocation, and everything that is needful in the best possible condition. But the vast *matériel* with which the field depots of an army must be constantly filled, in order to keep this human machine, the soldier, in marching or fighting condition, and provide for him when he is wounded or sick, we can bring before us only by an effort of the mind, applied to practical details. We must think of the supply-trains and the thousands of draught-animals required to serve them, and to serve the artillery, and of the horses of a higher class to remount the cavalry. We must think of clothing, and food, and forage; of hospital stores, of shelter-tents, of ammunition, of tools for intrenching purposes, of mechanical implements for all the manifold uses of a great multitude of men who can safely depend for nothing that is wanted upon the country around them. We must remember, too, that nothing is so destructive as war; that in a single battle a well-equipped army, even if victorious, may be reduced to a state bordering on destitution; and that a long and hurried march of troops may strip them of indispensable supplies if they get beyond the base from which their supplies are to come. Recollecting these things, we may be prepared to examine the wants of General McClellan's army after the battle of Antietam, not forgetting the important fact that it had been taken up by him after the defeat at the second Bull Run, in a condition of great derangement, and had been employed in marching or fighting from the 3d to the 17th of September, in which two weeks Maryland had been freed from the presence of the enemy and Washington had been saved.

The principal wants of this army, after the battle of Antietam, consisted of horses and forage, ammunition and food, and shoes and clothing for the men. Whenever an order might come to General McClellan enlarging the sphere of his operations and bidding

him advance across the Potomac, he could be in no condition to obey it unless these indispensable wants of his army had been supplied. Horses, forage, ammunition, and food came forward slowly ; but without shoes and clothing no army could be moved, and the deficiencies of this army in shoes and clothing continued to be enormous down to a very late period after the order of October 6th to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south was received. The reports of the army quartermasters, made to General McClellan's headquarters between the 15th and the 25th of October, leave no possible room for doubt that between those dates large bodies of the army were so destitute of shoes, clothing, and other indispensable supplies, that a general movement was impossible before it commenced. The chief quartermaster, Colonel Ingalls, reported on the 10th, four days after the date of the President's order to advance, "The suffering and impatience are excessive" ; and unless we suppose that he and the corps commanders, and the division and regimental quartermasters, were all engaged in a common conspiracy with General McClellan to misrepresent the condition of the troops, we must accept their statements as true. Some of the corps commanders sent their wagon-trains repeatedly on long journeys to the depots where the supplies should have been, and the wagons came back empty. Even on the 30th, after the movement across the Potomac began, some of the corps had not received their supplies, and did not receive them until they were crossing the river. Of course, it is entirely immaterial what may have appeared on the books or records of the Quartermaster-General's office in Washington in regard to the supplies ordered for the Army of the Potomac. The sole question is, When were they delivered at the depots of the army in southwestern Maryland, sixty or seventy miles from Washington? No one must lose sight of and no one must be permitted to obscure the issue : and it must not be forgotten that it was the duty of the authorities in Washington not only to order the supplies, but to cause them to be placed where they were wanted.

General McClellan's report contains a tabular statement of clothing and equipage received at the different depots of the Army of the Potomac, from the 1st of September to the 31st of October. It will be remembered that the battles of South Mountain and Antietam had been fought before the 1st of October. In whatever condition the army may have left Washington between the 3d and the 7th of September, the supplies received before or during those

battles could not have made up the deficiencies caused by the marching and fighting of the two weeks prior to the 18th of September, the day on which Lee's army was withdrawn into Virginia. The tabular statement above referred to shows that by far the greater bulk of most of the enumerated articles reached the depots of the army between the 15th and the 25th of October. But, from the 25th to the 31st there came in, of the single article "boots," 20,040, being 6,240 more than were received prior to the 25th. Of "bootees," there were received 52,900, between October 15th and 25th, being 43,900 more than were received before the 15th. Of "stockings," there came in, between the 15th and the 25th, 65,200; and between the 25th and the 31st, 30,000; being 95,200 received since October 15th, and amounting to 66,975 more than had been received prior to the 15th. A comparison of the other articles enumerated, "forage-caps," "cavalry-jackets," "canteens," "flannel shirts," "haversacks," "trousers," "coats," "shelter-tents," "camp-kettles," "mess-pans," "overcoats," "artillery-jackets," "blankets," "felt hats," "knit shirts and drawers," shows like results. There were, for example, 70,000 drawers received between the 15th and the 31st, being 42,300 more than all the supplies of this article that reached the army from the 1st of September to the 15th of October. On these facts, if we know how to deal with facts, we think our readers will concur with us in believing that Colonel Ingalls might well say on the 10th of October that the suffering and impatience were excessive; for let it be observed that these indispensable supplies, which came in so slowly, after the President's order of the 6th of October had directed a march, came, when they did come, to fill earnest and pressing requisitions upon the authorities in Washington, made continuously from the 11th to the 28th.

But we have not yet done with this branch of our subject. During the period of General McClellan's reiterated complaints that he was not receiving supplies indispensable to an advance into Virginia, the President, supposing that something was wrong, caused a step to be taken by a gentleman in whom he had entire confidence, and who was in every way qualified to ascertain the exact state of General McClellan's army. This was Colonel Thomas A. Scott, of Pennsylvania, who had been Assistant Secretary of War at a former period. From him we have obtained, through a common friend, the information given in a letter, dated at Philadelphia on the 19th of February of the present year, from which we are permitted to take the following extracts:

I had been actively engaged, about the time of Lee's [threatened] invasion of Pennsylvania, in looking after the defenses of our own border, especially in connection with the safety of our own lines of road. In the performance of this duty, I was necessarily called to Washington a number of times, and, while there, about the middle of October, 1862, I had a conversation with Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, and President Lincoln, in regard to the delay in the movement of General McClellan's army, and its reported condition of inefficiency to effect a movement without proper and greatly needed supplies. At the request of the President and Secretary of War I went to General McClellan's headquarters, near Harper's Ferry, and stated to him the object of my visit. General McClellan then said that it was not a matter that required discussion, but that he would have Major Myers, chief quartermaster of his staff, or rather of the Army of the Potomac,* show me the requisitions that had been made for supplies, and also a statement of the amount received, and that I could draw my own inferences from these data as to whether his army had been properly supplied or was in a condition to move. He stated that he was not only short of shoes, clothing, and other necessities for the men, but he had not the horses to move his cavalry and artillery, and, notwithstanding he had requested it, he had not been authorized to procure his horses from the country where his army lay, although he felt sure that he could do so more promptly and more cheaply than the horses could be furnished from Washington.

I said to General McClellan that both the President and the Secretary of War were under the impression that all supplies for which he had made requisitions had been furnished him, and that they could not understand why that should be given as a reason for his failing to move.

On learning the facts I have stated, I immediately returned to Washington, saw Mr. Stanton, General Halleck, and the President, and told them the exact state of the case. Both Mr. Stanton and General Halleck then repeated their assurance that all General McClellan's requisitions had been met; and it was then suggested that, as the troops in the forts around Washington constituted a part of the Army of the Potomac, the supplies that were intended for General McClellan's army in the field, instead of having been sent to him at Harper's Ferry, had by some means or other been diverted for the use of the troops in the fortifications, and thus had failed to reach him. This proved to be the explanation of the trouble, and, in conference with the President, he requested the Secretary of War to see that the supplies needed were forwarded at once to General McClellan's army at Harper's Ferry, and also that General McClellan was given the necessary authority to make requisitions upon the country for the horses needed for his army movement. Both of these things were, of course, done instantly, and the result was that General McClellan moved his army—I think in less than a fortnight after the supplies had been forwarded.

It is apparent, from the internal evidence of the dispatches, that

* Major Myers was the assistant quartermaster with Colonel Ingalls.

Colonel Scott's visit to the army and his report to the President must have occurred at some time between the 20th and the 28th of October. After the 20th there was an evident change of tone in the dispatches which General Halleck sent to General McClellan by order of the President. Thus, on the 21st Halleck telegraphed to McClellan: "Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the President. He directs me to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th instant. If you have not been, and are not now, in a condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. The President does not expect impossibilities; but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be lost. Telegraph when you will move, and on what lines you propose to march." Now, although General Halleck in an official letter, which he wrote to the Secretary of War on the 28th, still said that in his opinion there had been no such want of supplies as to prevent General McClellan's compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy, yet it is apparent that the President knew on the 21st that there must be reason to doubt the correctness of this opinion, and that he would not then permit McClellan to think that impossibilities were required of him. We therefore date the return of Colonel Scott from the army and his report to the President at some time after the 21st of October; and, from the fact that sufficient supplies had not been received on the 28th, and that on the 1st of November the last body of the army crossed the Potomac, we conclude that the supplies which Colonel Scott caused to be forwarded from Washington were dispatched on the 28th, 29th, or 30th of October.

The figures which we have given above, taken in connection with Colonel Scott's statements, show that between the 6th and the 25th of October the forts around Washington must have been gorged with supplies, while General McClellan's army in the field was left destitute. Was this a blunder of "red tape," or was it intentional? Who caused it, or who was responsible for it? Things are sometimes allowed to occur without leaving any trace by which the just responsibility for them can afterward be fixed. Whether it was by accident or design that General McClellan's requisitions were not filled until after the discovery was made by Colonel Scott of the real state of affairs, the detention of McClellan's army on the Maryland side of the Potomac until after the 28th of October is accounted for.*

* While these pages are passing through the press, we have received the results of a research which has been kindly made for us by the officials of the Baltimore and

But we must for a moment retrace our steps, and must again remind the reader that, from the 2d of September until the 6th of October, McClellan had no orders under which he could act otherwise than on the defensive. It has always seemed to us of the highest importance to ascertain, if possible, what were the counsels of Stanton and Halleck, and their compeers, which preserved intact that inexplicable and unparalleled state of things—McClellan and his great army without definite orders until the 6th of October. "General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington and of all the troops for the defense of the capital," remained his sole order from the 2d of September to the 6th of October. Mr. Lincoln knew that McClellan had no orders except to act on the defensive, and that he could not advance except at his peril. How was it, and by whom was it, that Mr. Lincoln was made to keep things in this condition for the space of five weeks? We can conceive of but one rational explanation of his conduct, which will relieve it from a criticism that we do not wish to make. He may have considered, down to the battle of Antietam, as McClellan did, that the order of September 2d, to act on the defensive, ended at the Potomac when McClellan had driven Lee across that river. If so, the period between the date of the battle of Antietam, September 17th, and the 6th of October was a period

Ohio Railroad Company, at their depot in Washington. These results establish the following facts: 1. During the month of October, 1862, the shipments of supplies for General McClellan's army, made from Washington, consisted chiefly of regimental baggage, medical stores, ammunition, harness, hardware, and iron. Some clothing was sent, but not in proportion to other articles. 2. On the 28th, 30th, and 31st of October, no shipments of clothing were made from Washington; but on the 29th there were seven packages and two boxes for the Fifth Regiment of New York Volunteers, and one hundred and fifty-two boxes consigned to Captain Alexander Bliss, at Harper's Ferry, accompanied by a special agent. This was the supply of clothing spoken of by Colonel Ingalls, the Chief Quartermaster, which was intended for Sumner's corps, and which Colonel Ingalls in his report said came almost too late for issue, as the army was then crossing into Virginia. (See McClellan's report, p. 424.) 3. Everything intended for General McClellan's army was dispatched from the Washington depot as soon as it was received there and could be loaded. The large quantities of clothing, shoes, and other supplies, embraced in the tabular statement given in General McClellan's report, and which were received at the army depots from the 25th to the 31st of October, were sent from Philadelphia, or Harrisburg, to Hagerstown; and a comparison of the dispatches sent by Colonel Ingalls to Harrisburg and his report leave no room to doubt that the effect of Colonel Scott's visit to the army and his report to the President was that, in the last days of October, there was the same (although late) activity in sending supplies to Hagerstown from Pennsylvania that was produced in sending supplies to Harper's Ferry from Washington.

when McClellan was both waiting for orders to advance and waiting for indispensable supplies. The order came to McClellan on the 7th of October, and the supplies that were absolutely necessary to enable him to execute it came at the end of three weeks afterward.*

We have now to describe briefly the plans which General McClellan had in view, after he crossed the Potomac, for dividing the forces of the enemy so that he could attack and beat them in detail. Six days sufficed for the march of fifty miles from the Potomac to Warrenton, after the last corps of the army had crossed; notwithstanding that heavy rains delayed the movement considerably in the beginning, and three of the corps had to wait at least one day at the crossings to complete their necessary supplies. At the end of the six days, General McClellan had made the different dispositions of his troops which his plans for advancing against the enemy contemplated. His headquarters were at Rectortown on the 6th of November. The main body of his infantry had then reached Warrenton, and his advanced cavalry lay some miles south of that place, toward Culpepper Court-House. Although, in the order of October 6th, the President had advised an interior line of movement so as to place the army between Washington and the enemy, yet he did not peremptorily direct it, and on the 26th of October General Halleck had telegraphed to General McClellan as follows: "Since you left Washington, I have advised and suggested in relation to your movements, but I have given you no orders. I do not give you any now. The Government has intrusted you with defeating and driving back the rebel army in your front. I shall not attempt to control you in the measures you may adopt for that purpose; you are informed of my views, but the President has left you at liberty to adopt them or not as you may deem best." Two observations may be made here: First, that General McClellan was to make his own plans for the campaign and to be responsible for them; second, that it was General McClellan who had been intrusted with the duty of defeating or driving back the enemy. Yet General Halleck was then preparing in Washington the evidence which was to be used to furnish the ostensible rea-

* The cruel suffering inflicted upon the soldiers by this failure to supply them with necessities could be described by living witnesses in terms that we can not command. It is a fact that many men, in a corps led by a gallant officer who has depicted to us their condition, marched from the Potomac to Warrenton with bare and bleeding feet, and could not be shod until they reached that place.

son for removing General McClellan from the command, before he could encounter the enemy by the plans which he had been left at liberty to adopt. Our readers will observe, as we proceed, that it could not have been on account of his intended strategy that General McClellan was to be removed; but that the evidence, which was to furnish a plausible ground for his removal, related wholly to the unnecessary delay on the field of Antietam which General Halleck and others in Washington falsely imputed to him.

The plan of campaign which General McClellan had adopted before he reached Rectortown can be best described in his own words:

The plan of campaign I adopted during the advance was to move the army well in hand parallel to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrenton as the point of direction for the main body, seizing each pass in the Blue Ridge by detachments as we approached it, and guarding them after we had passed, as long as they would enable the enemy to trouble our communications with the Potomac. It was expected that we would unite with the 11th Corps and Sickles's division near Thoroughfare Gap. We depended upon Harper's Ferry and Berlin for supplies, until the Manassas Gap Railway was reached; when that occurred, the passes in our rear were to be abandoned, and the army massed ready for action or movement in any direction.

It was my intention, if, upon reaching Ashby's or any other pass, I found that the enemy were in force between it and the Potomac, in the valley of the Shenandoah, to move into the valley and endeavor to gain their rear. I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did expect that, by striking in between Culpepper Court-House and Little Washington, I could either separate their army and beat them in detail, or else force them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville, and thus place the Army of the Potomac in position either to adopt the Fredericksburg line of advance upon Richmond, or to be removed to the Peninsula, if, as I apprehended, it were found impossible to supply it by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad beyond Culpepper.

He then gives in detail the positions in which he had placed the different corps of his army, in accordance with this plan, down to the 6th of November, adding: "Had I remained in command, I should have made the attempt to divide the enemy, as before suggested; and, could he have been brought to battle within reach of my supplies, I can not doubt that the result would have been a brilliant victory for our army."

At this time, the distance between the advanced pickets of General McClellan's cavalry and Longstreet's position at Culpepper Court-House was hardly six miles; and, from the compact mass of Federal troops collected around Warrenton to Longstreet's position,

the distance was not quite eighteen miles. At the same time General Lee, with the other half of his army, was about thirty miles to the northwest from McClellan's advanced position, and somewhat more than that from Longstreet. General McClellan might, therefore, have well anticipated that he would be able to separate the two wings of the Confederate army, beating Longstreet separately, or forcing him at least to fall back upon Gordonsville. In that event, to transfer the Federal army to Richmond would have been only a question respecting its base of supply. If it could not have been supplied directly from Washington, beyond Culpepper Court-House, it could have been thrown upon the Peninsula and have found its old base on the James, with all the advantages of water transportation. The map on opposite page shows the positions of the Federal and the Confederate troops on the 7th and 8th of November.

At a late hour on the night of November 7th, a special messenger from the War Department reached General McClellan's tent at Rectortown, bearing the following order :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., *November 5, 1862.*

GENERAL: On the receipt of the order of the President sent herewith, you will immediately turn over your command to Major-General Burnside, and repair to Trenton, New Jersey; reporting on your arrival at that place for further orders. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Major-General McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, *November 5, 1862.*


GENERAL ORDERS No. 182.

By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army.

By order of the Secretary of War :

E. D. TOWNSEND, *Adjutant-General.*

General Burnside arrived at General McClellan's tent with the messenger who brought the order. Having read the order, McClellan handed it to his successor, saying quietly, "Well, Burnside, you are to command the army." At an early hour on the next morning, McClellan, accompanied by his staff, rode toward Warrenton. The order changing the command had not then been promulgated to the army. As McClellan passed the columns on the road to Warrenton, the men greeted him as usual with their enthusiastic



cheers, but they looked inquiringly and anxiously into his face, for they had somehow, they knew not why, begun to fear that something extraordinary was about to happen. This foreboding, half-bewildered study of his countenance met him at every step. If the troops had known what he knew, what would have been their feelings, their demonstrations, their fears! He rode on, giving no sign of what was in his thoughts, but making his customary acknowledgments of the affectionate greetings of the men. After he reached Warrenton, a day was spent in viewing the positions of the troops and in conferences with General Burnside respecting future operations. In the course of that day the order was published, and General McClellan issued a farewell address to the army. On the evening of Sunday, the 9th, there was an assembly of officers who came to take leave of him. On the 10th he visited some of the various camps, and, amid the impassioned cries and demonstrations of the men, he took a last look of the troops who had followed him with such unfaltering devotion. "History," he said to the officers who crowded around him—"history will do justice to the Army of the Potomac, even if the present generation does not. I feel as if I had been intimately connected with each and all of you. Nothing is more binding than the friendship of companions in arms. May you all in future preserve the high reputation of our army, and serve all as well and faithfully as you have served me!" On the 11th, at Warrenton Junction, he entered with his staff a railroad train that was about to start toward Washington. Here there was stationed a detachment of two thousand troops. They were drawn up in line, and a salute was fired. The men then broke their ranks, surrounded the car in which he was seated, uncoupled it from the train and ran it back, insisting wildly that he should not leave them, and uttering the bitterest imprecations against those who had deprived them of their beloved commander. The scene has been described to us by an officer who was present as one of fearful excitement. The moment was critical. One word, one look of encouragement, the lifting of a finger, would have been the signal for a revolt against lawful authority, the consequences of which no man can measure. McClellan stepped upon the front platform of the car, and there was instant silence. His address was short. It ended in the memorable words, "Stand by General Burnside as you have stood by me, and all will be well." The soldiers were calmed. They rolled the car onward, recoupled it to the train, and with one long and mournful huzza bade farewell to their late com-

mander, whom many of them were destined never to behold again. General McClellan reached Washington on the following day, and without tarrying for an hour proceeded at once to Trenton, where he arrived at four o'clock in the morning of the 12th. From that time he never again saw Lincoln, or Stanton, or Halleck.

It is not inappropriate to consider here what was squandered by the Administration when they took McClellan from the service of the country. Aside from all his other powers, in which his usefulness as a general far exceeded those of any other man who was then on this side of the Alleghany range, there can be no question that he possessed the rare power of inspiring his troops with confidence in his abilities and attachment to his person, to a very uncommon degree. What was the secret of his power over men? Why was it that they loved him and fought under him so bravely, so steadily, oftentimes against odds that would have made an army quail under another leader? During the seven days of the perilous march to the James, there was terrible fighting; but the Army of the Potomac saved its honor, although attacked, through a whole week, by a far larger force, led by some of the ablest generals in the Confederate service. If McClellan, when he ordered that flank movement, had been suddenly succeeded by any other general who can be named, that army would have been annihilated. When the combined forces under Pope were driven back upon Washington in a disorderly rout, why was it that, the instant McClellan's restoration to command became known, the old enthusiasm, discipline, and order were restored, as if by magic? Why did the officers and the troops fight at Antietam as we know they did fight—no important movement in the battle, save one, failing to be executed when the order for it was first given? What, we again ask, was the secret of McClellan's power over an army?

It is worth while to analyze such a power if we can, because, when it exists, it constitutes, for a government that is at war, one of its dearest possessions. It is a public property, as valuable as any other resources for successful warfare, and therefore requiring the most careful and conscientious husbandry. A government that throws away such a moral power might as well cripple itself by destroying one half of its physical means. It has often been said that an army is a machine, and that the more nearly it approaches to the condition of a physical machine, that is absolutely under the control of an operator, the better army it is. But this idea of an army, at least in modern times and in wars in which a great public

principle is at stake, requires a good deal of modification. An army is a machine, but it is a moral and conscious machine, as well as a physical one. It has feelings, passions, intelligence, quick perceptions, and a capacity to understand what is required of it. That impalpable essence which is called the *esprit de corps* of an army, what is it but the aggregate feeling of a great body of men, into which are fused for a time the moral existences of the individuals that compose the mass? Take two soldiers from the ranks, and compare their differences in courage, physical strength, power of endurance, intelligence, and spirit of obedience, and the differences will often be found to be very great. But there is a resultant of these qualities, when the average is formed by the union of a great mass of individual characters in one organization, and that resultant of moral and physical forces is the complex machine with which a commander has to deal.

In studying the careers of distinguished generals who have possessed something more of power over their armies than the mere authority of their stations gave them, it will be found that the individual character of the man has had a great deal to do with his influence over his troops. There have been commanders in whom the passion for personal glory has been the strongest force in their natures; and when the national character has been one that feels national glory to be the greatest of all objects, and that character has pervaded the armies, deeds almost superhuman have been done. When Napoleon I. fulminated his bombastic addresses to his troops, he touched a chord of the national honor in their breasts, a feeling for the honor of France, while he at the same time aroused in them a passionate sympathy with his own glory. When we turn to commanders of an entirely different moral character, we must still look to their personal qualities for the secret of whatever extraordinary influence they may have exercised over their troops, and must also take into consideration the national character and the nature of the war. In our late civil war there was a principle at stake on both sides, which the masses of the armies on both sides well understood, from the first. Perhaps there were greater numbers of soldiers of foreign birth in the Federal than there were in the Confederate armies, but this foreign element did not prevent the national character and the national feeling from predominating over and pervading the whole. As a general thing, the soldiers of foreign birth in the Federal service understood and believed in the importance of the principle at stake as well as the native Americans; and, when

the Federal conscription took place, it was the popular conviction of the necessity for reëstablishing the Union under one government that caused a general submission of all classes to a measure that was unquestionably beyond the limits of constitutional authority.

General McClellan himself was a most conspicuous embodiment of the national feeling for the Union, which existed throughout the States that adhered to the Federal Government, as he was of the general conviction that the welfare of the whole country required that State secession be suppressed. He had and he used a great power to impart this feeling and conviction to his troops. Officers and men who fought under him knew what they were fighting for, and they knew it all the better and felt it all the more intensely because of the example given to them by a commander whom they respected for his virtues, and loved for his conscientious care of their lives. They knew that he had a great heart as well as a wise head. They knew that in executing his orders they were obeying a mind equal to any emergency that they had to encounter; and that for those who would have to meet death, or wounds, or disease, there would be that tender pity which is the soldier's greatest consolation, and that this softer quality of human nature was in McClellan blended with the most robust manliness. Such was the feeling toward him, alike among officers and men; but the former regarded him with a larger recognition. They saw in him a representation of the best attributes of our national character—of its cultivation, its instructed energy, its moral and religious principle, its capacity to encounter difficulties, its devotion to duty, its disdain of unworthy arts, its superiority to vulgar ambitions, its power of self-control when injuries, and injustice, and obloquy, are heaped upon faithful and true-hearted service. To this we must add the effect, upon all classes, of what it is difficult to describe, but it is something that all can understand. It goes by the name of personal magnetism. It is that charm of the personal presence, which is compounded of what beams from the countenance and is expressed in the manners, and what is intuitively felt to be the nature of the man. It is a mysterious influence, but a very powerful one. There have been highly distinguished military men who have not had a particle of this power, and whom one never cares to see a second time. But, when this power is possessed, it is a great treasure. The dying boy, on the field of Antietam, who raised himself on his elbow as his general rode by in the heat of the battle, shouted out

the familiar name with the most affectionate endearments, and then dropped dead upon the turf, might have told the great men at Washington what they would lose if they should take this commander from the head of that army.

We shall close our discussion of this subject in the next number of the Review, with a consideration of the political reason which is supposed to have operated upon President Lincoln, and to have caused him to remove General McClellan from the command of the Army of the Potomac. We have shown that the alleged unnecessary delay after the battle of Antietam could not have been publicly assigned by the President as a reason for this act. The delay was known to the President, nearly two weeks before the date of the order changing the command, to have been occasioned solely by the want of indispensable supplies. It remains for us, therefore, to examine the political reason which has been suggested as the explanation of the President's course. This will bring us to the character and purpose of the Harrison's Landing letter, which General McClellan wrote to Mr. Lincoln just four months before he was ordered to turn over the command to General Burnside and to report at Trenton.

G. T. C.